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I shall be concerned mainly with some of the things Aristotle says
about character and characterisation in the Poetics. But I shall begin
with some remarks about the general context of the discussion as
suggested by the broad title of the paper. Aristotle's treaunent of
poetry has sometimes been seen as a form of aestheticism, that is to
say, as an argument for the complete autonomy of poetic values and
standards. This interpretation rests most generally on the well known
opposition between Aristotle and Plato in regard to the nature of
poetry and its place in human life. Plato in the Republic assessed
poetry essentially in terms of his conception of universal truth and
eternal moral goodness. On these grounds. he rejected poetry as full
of lies and untruths. especially in what it has to say about the gods.
Secondly, he castigated it for purveying unworthy moral and
educational values and for engendering wayward emotional responses
and illegitimate pleasure.
These criticisms were directed, of course, at poetry as Plato
was familiar with it. specifically Homer's epic poetry and the great
dramatic tragedies of the fifth century written by Aeschylus,
Sophocles and Euripides. But in Book X of the Republic this critique
is given general force in connection with Plato's account of an as
imitation (mimesis), where mimesis is understood as the realisation
of an essentially limited and distoned mirror on reality. In taking this
line, Plato was not unaware of the power and beauty of poetry.
Indeed the anistry of great poetry is precisely what makes it so
dangerous and harmful in his eyes, for through its anistry it works on
the emotions and draws the audience deeply into its limited and
distoned vision of the world. In this case it is all the more necessary
to subject mimetic an, poetry and drama in particular, to the judgment
of reason and the universal and overriding canons of truth and
morality to uncover its true nature.
Aristotle by contrast takes the view that the pleasure associated
with poetry is natural and legitimate. Mimesis, of which poetry is a
• Paper given to the Inaugural Colloquium of the Sydney Society of Literature
and Aesthetics. Oct. 4-5. 1990.
15
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
mode, is spoken of as natural to human beings from childhood, and
there is the proposal that it is also natural for everyone to delight in
works of mimesis (see Poetics 1448b5-8). As for the demands of
truth, Aristotle did not think that poetic description is properly subject
to the criticism of not being 'true to fact'; he was not disturbed,
therefore, by what Homer and the writers of tragedy had to say of the
gods on the grounds that 'the tales about the gods ... may be wrong,
not true and not the proper thing to say, nonetheless they are certainly
what people say' (Poetics 1461 b35ft). Errors in descriptions,
even impossibilities, are held to be justifiable if they serve the end
of poetry itself, by making the poetic effect more astounding for
example (Poetics 1460b25f.). Most significantly, he insisted that
'correctness in poetry is not of the same kind as correctness in
politics, or indeed any other art' (Poetics 1460bI3-15). Politics in
Aristotle's classification is the master art, the supreme science of
the good; it thus embraces moral philosophy. On the face of it, then,
he singles out poetry as a domain of life and practice insulated from
morality and normal requirements of truth, secure in its own
procedures and standards. In short, Aristotle's reaction against
Plato's view of art in the Republic is interpreted as a form of
aestheticism.
I take the view that this interpretation is a superficial and partial
reading of the Poetics. Aristotle is concerned to rescue poetry from
the wholesale subordination to the high and narrow conception of
truth and moral values to which Plato is disposed to subject it. He is
certainly willing to recognise it as an art. The very fact that he devotes
a separate treatise to the topic is witness to his recognition of its
significance as an art with its own specific form. In similar vein, he is
sensitive to the various forms of poetry (as he was familiar with them)
and to the qualities of poetry as poetry of one or another sort. But it is
quite contrary to Aristotle's way of thinking, as it was to Greek
thinking generally, to suppose that aesthetic principles could form an
independent set of values insulated from ethical and political values
and, indeed, from a general view of the cosmos. That Aristotle did
not set poetry apart in the way aestheticism would require is in any
case obvious from the significance he attached to the role of music
and poetry in the moral education of the young (see Politics, 1339a).
Aristotle holds, as noted above, that poetry has its own forms of
procedure and that 'correctness in poetry is not of the same kind as
correctness in politics or indeed any other art'. This rules out the sort
of moralism and didacticism which Plato was drawn to impose on
poetry. But it is consistent with the claim in Aristotle's ethical and
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political writings that 'the goal of political science must embrace those
of other branches of knowledge' (Nicomachean Ethics 1094b6). Art
in all its forms, and poetry in a particular way, is bound to be drawn
into the embrace of political episteme.
Towards the end of his quarrel with the poets, Plato opens up the
possibility of a reconciliation by issuing an invitation (or a challenge):
We would allow the champions of poetry-men who do not
practise the art themselves, but are lovers of it to offer a prose
defence on its behalf, showing that poetry is a source not only of
pleasure, but also of benefit to communities and to the life of
man. And we shall listen graciously. (Republic 10, 607d)
As Stephen Halliwell suggests in his book Aristotle's Poetics
(London, 1986), the Poetics can be read as a response to this
invitation. Both elements in the case for the defence-that poetry is
at once a source of pleasure and of benefit to communities and
human life-are linked essentially with ethical assessment and the
consideration of poetry within a more general conception of human
life. One has to say that, in defending poetry, Aristotle does not
labour the ethical dimension excessively in the Poetics. But this does
not lessen its significance in his approach to the topic. Aristotle would
suppose that the reader of the Poetics would also have studied the
Politics and the Ethics. The point is that a proper reading of the
Poetics ought to take account of the ideas expounded in these related
sources. In a short paper such as this, one can hardly do more than
note this requirement as a condition of adequate interpretation or, at
least, of an interpretation with a reasonable claim to completeness. I
have no intention of embaI1cing on the undertaking here of reading the
Poetics through an account of the ethical and political writings. It
would in fact be a major task simply to consider the explicitly ethical
themes, and related presuppositions and implications, within the
Poetics itself. I have stated a general contention in regard to the
interpetation of the Poetics. But given that all interpretation has to
begin somewhere, at some necessarily limited point, I propose to
confine my further remarks to some of the things Aristotle says about
character and characterisation in the Poetics. This has obvious bearing
on ethical considerations in the text and is a large topic in itself.
The inevitable starting point is the logos of tragedy (definition/key
summary) which Aristotle provides in chapter 6 of the Poetics after
he has made his entry into the topic:
A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and
also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with
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pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the
parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with
incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its
catharsis of such emotions.
A little further on in this chapter he proposes that 'Tragedy is an
imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and
misery ... '
The emphasis on happiness (eudaimonia) in this passage
immediately places tragedy within the domain of ethics. Morality, as
Aristotle conceives it, is concerned with promoting human good. That
is to say, it is concerned with promoting the conditions in which
human beings act well and live well which are in turn the conditions
of wellbeing or happiness. Happiness as eudaimonia, as the passage
quoted from the Poetics makes clear, has a primarily active sense: it
conveys broadly the sense of an overall situation in which a person
acts well. But it draws in also the idea of a personal and social context
in which things go well for a person in the major respects of life. The
primary condition for this possibility in the Aristotelian framework
lies in the possession of a complex set of excellences or virtues
conceived as dispositions for action and feeling exercised in choice
and responsibility. Virtue is what makes it possible for a person to act
well in any sustained sense. Nevertheless, while the possession of the
moral virtues or excellences ensures that a person is morally good and
acts well, it cannot ensure happiness in the full sense. Eudaimonia
depends on other things as well, external conditions such as the sort
of society and times one lives in, for example, and on one's having a
degree of luck in matters over which one has little or no control.
The particular interest and force of tragedy in this context for the
Aristotelian conception of ethical and political life is that tragedy
typically portrays a situation in which moral virtue and the external
conditions for happiness come apart. Commonly in Greek tragedy, a
person who is happy in the full sense, possessing good fortune,
status and success along with the primary requirement of virtue, is
confronted dramatically with evil times and bad fortune. So Oedipus,
or Antigone, or Hecuba. How the person acts in this situation, how
he or she copes with the problems and the bad fortune which confront
them, is the primary focs of the drama according to Aristotle. This is
the basic point to which Aristotle draws attention in saying that
tragedy is essentially a mimesis of action and life. Action and life as
the primary focus of attemion, however, have to be related back to the
character of the person concerned.
Aristotle discusses character and characterisation in three places in
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the Poetics. He speaks of it in the context of poetry in general in
Chapter 2, and he considers it with panicular reference to tragedy in
Chapter 6 and again in Chapter 15. Character, ethos, in the Poetics
connotes persons or agents in respect of generic moral quality or
standing; it is used in a more neutral way on occasions to stand for
persons or agents as in the phrase 'the characters in a play'; and it is
also used to connote characterisation as a propeny of a play. Aristotle
offers a logos of the term ethos in Chapter 6 (a definition which
recurs in much the same terms in Chapter 15):
Character in a play is that which reveals the moral purpose of the
agents, i.e. the sort of thing they seek or avoid ... hence there is
no room for character in a speech on a purely indifferent subject
(1450b810).
It is obvious that this account of character is essentially ethical in
its focus. The term which is translated here as moral purpose is
prohairesis. It is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical writings and
might be translated more informatively as something like deliberate
moral choice. Prohairesis is choice involving conscious desire and
intention which is based on dispositions for action and feeling which
are precisely dispositions ofvinue and vice. Character in other words
is based on dispositions to act well or badly, that is, dispositions
which are classified as either vinues or vices and which are
manifested in deliberate choice. In shon, Aristotle offers an account
of character in the context of poetry (and specifically of tragedy)
which draws immediately on his ethical ideas.
This understanding of character is obviously very different from
modern conceptions of the notion (and perhaps even more so from
post-modern conceptions of character). The essential emphasis on
ethical dimensions marks the most obvious difference: dramatic
characterisation is made to consist centrally in the ponrayal of moral
choice. The Aristotelian conception of character is consequently
narrow and determinate in comparison with the very general and
vague scope of character in modern literature. Does it suffer in
comparison in this respect? That is a question I will not seek to pursue
here other than to take brief note of two considerations.
First, an admission of the essentially ethical conception of
character in the Poetics should be accompanied with recognition of the
broad scope of the ethical in Aristotle's thought. In contrast to more
narrowly conceived modem views about the domain of the moral, the
Aristotelian understanding of happiness and misery runs across
the whole field of human endeavour. Poetry, as an enrichment of
human life, thereby has moral significance. Secondly, Aristotle's
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account is offered (albeit unselfconsciously) in the context of Greek
poetry, tragedy in particular. In this light, it may be seen as the
attempt, not so much to lay down a principle, as to acknowledge the
role of Homer and other poets in Greek culture and to capture the
poets' own understanding of their art. Thus Aristophanes had
declared, in speaking of the calling of the poet: 'We must indeed say
things that are good, because to little children it is the schoolmaster
who speaks, but to those past puberty it is poets'. Aristotle in effect
endorses the ethico-political vocation of the poet, even if he would
agree with Plato in holding that the chief place in discourse about the
good in human life belongs to the philosopher.
Aristotle's conception of character also differs from modern
emphases in that it has little or no place for the psychological
conceived as the inner life of the person. He gives a good deal of
attention to the importance of thought and emotional response, as well
as action, in gauging characterisation in a play (as with the character
of Oedipus in Oedipus the King for example). Nevertheless, the
primary locus of character, revealed in deliberate moral choice, is
located in manifest action and feeling. There is also a difference about
the way in which the individual is conceived in this context.
Aristotelian ethics and Greek tragedy alike place considerable
emphasis on the individual and on individual choice of action. But
individuals such as Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes, Oedipus,
Antigone, and the like, while they are enough like us to arouse
feelings of pity and fear, are enlarged by their social and mythic status
and are presented as types of human beings. In a related way, the
conception of character in terms of virtues and vices is a matter of
generic qualities rather than individual traits of personality.
Aristotle's most insistent thesis in regard to character, in drama as
in life, is that it is subordinate to action. A tragedy is essentially the
acting out of a story; its life and soul is the action (and events) played
out in the story, that is, the plot or muthos, 'the combination of the
incidents, or things done in the story' in Aristotle's words. This
emphasis is linked generally with Aristotle's view that character, as
marked out by virtue or vice, is the outcome of action. We become
just by doing just acts (by being got to do them at first), as we
become courageous by acting courageously. and so on for the other
virtues. Similarly, character, which is thus brought into being through
action, cannot be maintained for long independently of relevant
practical activity. Character in short is brought about by action and is
properly realised and sustained in action. It thus stands in a direct and
fundamental relationship of subordination to action in the first place
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and finds its expression in action.
In Chapter 6 of the Poetics Aristotle proposes that a tragedy
which has a good action-structure and story line but poor charac-
terisation is preferable to one dominated by 'ethical set-speeches' (i.e.
'speeches of character'). This proposal. it can be seen, is not a mere
expression of preference for onc son of play over another. It is
grounded in Aristotle's general account of the relationship of action
and character together with the view that poetic mimesis should
reflect the main features of human life. A play which consists mainly
of ethical sct-speeches is necessarily incomplete and unbalanced. In
being devoid of action it fails to ponray the substantial element of life
within which character is formed and properly realised.
What Aristotle offers is an agent-centred view of tragedy with the
primary focus on purposive (moral) choice and action. It follows that
the main figure of tragedy cannot be a passive victim, totally
overwhelmed by circumstances outside his or her control. Aristotle is
surely not wrong in this contention. Nevenheless, an emphasis on the
tragic character as agent could run into problems in acknowledging
the necessary element of suffering in tragedy and in allowing
sufficient play to such elements as chance. the unpredictable
consequences of action, the force of history, and the influence of
powers outside human agency in the course of human destiny. It is
sufficiently clear from other sources, notably Physics II, that the
Aristotelian conception of the cosmos provides room for chance (in
the form of bad luck for example) and unpredictability. In various
other respects too, Aristotle is sensitive to the vulnerability of human
happiness with reference to both vinue and good fonune. But he has
no sympathy for the idea of outside forces in his secularised account
of tragedy. The Aristotelian cosmos is one in which human destiny is
worked out in the natural world, not in the world of the stars. This is
a world in which tragedy is not impossible. Nevenheless, an
approach which emphasises rational choice and purposive agency and
which takes a predominantly optimistic view of human powers
undoubtedly makes tragedy less plausible.
One could still say that the affirmation of agency over passivity is
central to Greek tragedy. Agency in this context is characteristically
affirmed in the face of severe limiting conditions and crisis. Never-
theless, without agency, there would be no fully human response of
which one could properly speak. but merely the ponrayal of some
overwhelming crisis. Agency, it should be noted, is not in opposition
to the emotions either here or elsewhere, for the emotions are tied in
with beliefs and with related patterns of behaviour which may, or may
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not, make sense in a given set of circumstances. Again, the interest of
tragedy lies significantly in the ponrayal of how the agent responds in
feelings as well as in action to the crisis.
Attention to agency and action might seem to render the idea of
character superfluous. This supposition could appear to be given even
stronger suppon by Aristotle's proposal in chapter 6 of the Poetics
that while 'tragedy is impossible without action, ... there might be
one without Character' (1450a24- 5). On the other hand, this claim
appears panicularly puzzling in the light of what is said about action
and character in Chap. 2 in relation to poetry in general. The clear
argument in the earlier chapter is that poetry is a mimesis of the
actions of agents who have a character of some son, necessarily being
in their character either good or bad, or at some point on a scale
between goodness and badness (goodness and badness being the
criterion on which difference in character rests). It seems to follow
that the ponrayal of action of any sustained son, such as in drama,
will necessarily include characterisation (that is, moral
characterisation). Is there a contradiction between what is said about
the inescapability of character in any form of mimesis in chapter 2 and
the supposition in chapter 6 that there might be a tragedy without
Character? Attention to context would suggest that rather different
concerns are at issue.
The main point of the passage in Chapter 2 is that, in the words of
Stephen Halliwell, "the agents of poetry are in general morally
characterised, since character is the natural concomitant of most
human action of any significance' (p.153). In Chapter 6, by contrast,
the focus of attention is directed to the much more specific
consideration of the dramatic balance between action and character in
a play. There could not be a tragedy, Aristotle says, in which nobody
did anything. But there might be one in which, while action occurs (is
ponrayed), nothing, or nothing of significance, is conveyed about
character. This comment, however, has to be understood as a
criticism, not as a concession that there are agents who are without
character. Aristotle goes on to complain, in fact, that 'the tragedies of
most of the modems are characterless', the implication being that they
are of poor quality. This is connected precisely with the fundamental
link between action and character. The weakness of the all-action/no
character play is that, in the absence of characterisation, it is difficult
to make sense of the action.
Aristotle's formal and most extended treaunent of character and
characterisation in the context of poetry is presented in Chapter 15 of
the Poetics. I propose to conclude this paper with some brief and
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unfinished remarlcs on what is said about character in this chapter.
The first remark is that the discussion is, in fact, disappointingly
compressed and thin. The treaunent of the construction of the plot,
which Aristotle sees as 'at once the first and the most important thing
in tragedy', runs over some eight chapters in the text (chapters 7-14).
The element of character, which is brought under scrutiny in the
second place, occupies barely 36 lines.
There are, Aristotle says briskly, four things to be aimed at in
characterisation in tragedy: the characters are to be (morally) good,
the character attributed to them needs to be appropriate, they should
be 'like the reality', and they should appear in a consistent way
throughout
(i) The requirement that the characters be morally good is
presented as the most important of these concerns, and it is filled out
with the suggestion that target will be met if the speech or action of
the person manifests an element of good moral choice. The sole
additional observation on this point is that goodness of a sufficient
sort is achievable by every type of person, albeit at progressively
lower levels of achievement on the part of women and slaves. The
prejudicial remark in regard to women and slaves is of a piece with
Aristotle's views in the ethical and political writings. With reference
to what is said about slaves. he is caught in immediate inconsistency
since he comments both that their behaviour can reveal good moral
choice and that the slave 'is a wholly worthless being'. Such blatant
inconsistency is regrettable, and not merely, one might say, because
Aristotle was the founder of logic. There is inconsistency of a less
immediate sort in the estimate of women's virtue (as inferior to male
virtue) since in the Rhetoric Aristotle appeals to Sophocles' Antigone
as the spokesperson of universal natural justice (Rhetoric, I, 13:
1373b7-11).
The requirement that the characters in tragedy be shown as
morally good is curious in another way. inasmuch as it is left
unqualified. Taken as it stands, the remarlc would imply that every
character in tragedy is to appear as morally good. One has to suppose
that Aristotle could not have meant this since there are so many
counter-examples in Greek tragedy. In any case. some forms of moral
goodness, especially heroic virtue, arise precisely in response to
moral badness. The more reasonable supposition is that Aristotle
means that the central characters with whom we are drawn to feel fear
and pity need to appear as morally good. Even then, there is a good
deal more moral ambiguity in Greek tragedy than Aristotle seems
willing to acknowledge.
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There is a remark earlier in the Poetics (in chapter 2) to the effect
that one of the distinguishing marks of tragedy as against comedy is
'that one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than
the men of the present day' (1448al6f). While the point is picked up
again in chapter 15 ('tragedy is an imitation of personages better than
the ordinary man '), one would not do Aristotle a service in taking this
as an absolute claim or in worrying excessively about it as a universal
truth. There is a sense of the main figures of tragedy as somewhat
larger than life (though not so far from us that we cannot feel fear and
pity on their behalf), members of a royal household in many cases,
men and women caught up in some dreadful crisis in which high
moral choice becomes peculiarly possible. Aristotle's concern, in
Stephen Halliwell's words, 'is partly with what might be called the
generic tone or ethos, with the gravity and ethical seriousness of
tragedy's characteristic material' (p.158).
The requirement for characters in tragedy to appear as morally
good almost certainly reflects a basic Aristotelian conviction that
tragedy should lend support to basic moral standards. How else could
it be so central, along with music, in the moral development of the
young? But certainly in comparison with Plato, Aristotle is sensitive
to dramatic context in the portrayal of moral behaviour and he takes a
relaxed attitude in regard to truth and exactness (as in what is said
about the gods). To go back again finally to the requirement for moral
goodness, the best interpretation of Aristotle's view is related, as
Halliwell proposes, to the centrality of undeserved suffering in
tragedy:
over and above the generic attribute of seriousness, goodness of
tragic character is required precisely (and unplatonically) because
at the crux of the ideal plots defined in the Poetics lies the idea of
undeserved suffering, whether actual or threatened: and it is on
this premise that other features of the theory, such as the
distinctive combination of tragic emotions, depend. (p.158-9).
(ii) The requirement that the character attributed to a person be
appropriate is treated succinctly and tellingly by Aristotle: 'the
character before us may be, say, manly; but it is not appropriate in a
female character to be manly, or clever' (1454a21f). This is based
importantly on a strong connection in Aristotle's thought (and in
Greek thought generally) between moral character and types of
temperament on the one hand and personal status on the other,
especially such considerations as one's sex, age, political status, and
one's nationality. Aristotle'S account of temperament and emotional
qualities in respect of age for example (the young, the middle-aged,
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the old) is explored especially in the Rhetoric. But canons of
appropriateness. it can be seen. include a peculiarly moral emphasis.
In his ethical and political writings, Aristotle speaks of a nature
and goal for human beings quite generally (the 'human good'), and
clearly intends his ideas to have general application. In fact, his
account of morality has a very definite, historically shaped cultural
setting. Aristotle's morally mature human being is male rather than
female, a free man rather than a slave, a Greek rather than a barbarian,
a man who is at once the head of a household and a citizen in a polis
with a part to play in government, a man well enough off to enjoy
a degree of cultivated liesure, hence not a craftsman or a manual
labourer. Those who are excluded from the privileged group are
not thereby excluded from a certain level and style of moral life, but
in one sense or another they are held to fall short of the standard
of completeness. Thus, in a variety of ways, status governed
appropriateness in respect to morality. (Aristotle's example in which
manliness is said to be inappropriate to a woman character is
particularly telling since the Greek word for the virtue courage,
andreia, means 'of a man, manliness'). While much of what Aristotle
says, or assumes, about the cormection between status (etc) and moral
virtue can be readily exposed as unsatisfactory, we would be wrong
to conclude that the moral basis of his conception of character is
thereby undermined. For one thing, inclusion in the privileged group
was certainly no guarantee of moral achievement, as is clear from the
fact that Aristotle was critical of the conventional mores of his socia!
class. the well born and the well to do.
(iii) About the third requirement for character-that characters be
made 'like the reality'-Aristotle says nothing other than that. in his
sense of the term, it is not the same as characters being good or
appropriate. One interpretation supposes that likeness to reality refers
to a fit between the dramtist's portrayal of a character and the
character in the original mythical source. This is unlikely, however,
if one takes account of Aristotle'S relaxed attitude to truth as
correspondence in this context. The function of the poet, he says in
Chapter 9. is to describe not the thing that has happened, but a kind of
thing that might happen (145Ia36). There would in any case be
considerable difficulty in settling on the right account of the original.
One possibilility is that being 'like the reality' has the generic
force of 'being true to life'. Later in the chapter, Aristotle argues that
tragedy. as a rule. should avoid improbability among its incidents and
not rely too much on stage artifice. Again. picking up the point from
chapter two that tragedy is an imitation of personages better than
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ourselves, he proposes that 'we should foIIow the example of good
portrait painters, who reproduce the distinctive features of a man, and
at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer
than he is' (1454b9 1I). The Greek tragic dramatist is concerned with
a tradition in which the tragic characters are mythical figures who are
larger than life in their status and moral significance. (Consider
Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes, Iphegenia, Oedipus, Antigone,
Hecuba). What is asked, nonetheless, is that these characters be
portrayed as true to life, or as genuinely possible human beings who
are sufficiently like a contemporary audience for the laner to recognise
in them a common humanity and moral affinity and to grasp the
momentous crisis in their lives and be drawn into the (moraIIy
appropriate) experience of fear and pity in response to their situation.
(iv) Aristotle refers in the final place to the requirement for
consistency in characterisation throughout the drama (making a
character consistently inconsistent if that it what is appropriate). This
condition is associated most directly with the Aristotelian emphasis on
overall intelligibility within a play, in terms of which a plot, along
with elements of the unexpected or strange, holds together and
gathers a compelling sense of inevitability. Consistency could then be
seen as mainly an epistemological or aesthetic requirement. But in
drawing attention to this point, Aristotle returns to his insistence that
tragedy is concerned most deeply with the portrayal of behaviour of a
morally good sort (in conditions involving suffering and crisis).
One's sense of the action, however, rests on the portrayal of character
in the drama and on the ways in which action is shown as the
outcome of character.
Aristotle's brief discussion of character in Chapter 15 could be
fiIIed out, while remaining in the Poetics, by reference back to what is
said about plot structure in the preceding chapters. This applies in
particular to the treaunent of the emotions of pity and fear. The
observation that 'pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and
fear by that of one like ourselves' (1453a4) leads on to the conclusion
that tragedy is best concerned with characters who are neither
outstandingly good or bad, but 'the intermediate kind of personage, a
man not preeminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune is brought
upon him not by vice and depravity but by some fault, of the number
of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e.g.
Oedipus, Thyestes ... ' (1453a6- 10).
The reference to fault (hamartia) in this passage opens up a
question of vast dispute in the history of discussion of the Poetics.
The notion clearly has some bearing on the idea of moral character.
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But I will not discuss it here other than to suggest that Aristotle's
notion of hamartia is not a matter of moral fault or of defect of moral
character in the person concerned. Tragedy deals mo t generally with
an individual (or a family) undergoing a dramatic change of fortune,
typically a change from good fortune to bad. But Aristotle does not
uppose that the source of things going wrong can be traced back to a
moral fault in the person (or family) concerned. Hi focus on
character a ethical i concerned rather with the way in which agent-
characters of tragedy respond, how they feel and what they do, in the
face of their unhappy situation.
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